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
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TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH VIETNAM

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TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH VIETNAM

No. 167

This serial publication contains translations of political, economic, and sociological articles on North Vietnam. Complete bibliographic information accompanies each article.

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CAPTURE OF US PILOT JAMES H. KASLER

[Following is a translation of an unsigned article in the German-language periodical Neue Berliner Illustrierte (New Berlin Illustrated), No. 17, East Berlin, April 1967, pages 14-15].

Vietnam is always in our thoughts. For over seven weeks writers Kurt and Jeanne Stern experienced the American war of shame against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For 52 days they lived the everyday life and the struggle of the courageous Vietnamese people. They sought the answer to questions that people throughout the world have been asking for over two years. Above all, they sought the answer to the question: How is it possible that such a small nation that is still so weak technically, resists such a powerful foe as US imperialism. This is the first eyewitness report which they wrote for NBI.

Their aircraft carriers are sixty kilometers away from the coast of North Vietnam. One of them is called the US Intrepid. Intrepid means fearless. Every thirty seconds a jet bomber leaves this nest of "fearless" pirates. Three minutes later, they are over land.

Of course, high explosive bombs, phosphorous, napalm, and poison are the principal ration which they drop on a daily and hourly basis. But it is a "communist slander" that they only bring the peaceful Vietnamese death and destruction. After they have destroyed a suitable number of dwellings, schools, churches and hospitals, laid waste to enough rice fields and killed a sufficient number of people, other American "presents" descend from the Vietnamese skies. For example, people -- if one can use Gorkiy's proud sounding designation with respect to spies, saboteurs and agents -- which they land from time to time. Of late, however, this is less frequent because the "fearless" can barely find volunteers for this. The reception accorded them is all too unhospitable; the Vietnamese judges to whom they are without fail handed over by the populace do not play games.

Not infrequently the heroes of the Seventh Fleet attempt to be particularly cunning. They call this "psychological warfare." They drop dozens of millions of leaflets. And they are full of things! One time threats, another -- promises. Either: "We Shall Destroy Your Economy"

or: "We Bring You Peace and Welfare." If this madness, there is no method to it.

But the leaflets are by no means the end. There is still something else that falls out of the Vietnamese sky -- whether you believe it or not -- presents without strings. Yes, really! These inventive yankees who are known for their firm conviction that anything can be bought for dollars have tried this too: "If we can't bring these damned Vietnamese to their senses with bombs and poison," they have reasoned, "perhaps we can do so with transistor radios, chocolate, and toys; we are wealthy and they are poor." But just imagine. These Vietnamese are so unthankful that they do not accept presents from their murderers. They throw everything into a heap and burn it. In a heated discussion with our Vietnamese friends, we considered this wrong: "Take all these things and divide them among the best fighters and their children so that they will fight still better against the aggressors" was our idea. But at that time we did not know our proud Vietnamese well. "The only thing we take from these criminals is what we win in battle," they replied. And there is yet something else that comes from the skies; that which the Vietnamese take in battle as booty: the downed airplanes that will never more return to their "Intrepid." Someone will ask what they can do with booty in the form of wreckage. But this person will not know the inventive, diligent Vietnamese. In the most heavily bombed zone in the southern part of the DRV there is a farm implements plant: up to September 1966, it had forged 16,000 plowshares out of American bomb fragments and wrecked airplanes. The astonishing thing is that the shameless and greedy war criminals have still not thought of presenting the **Vietnamese a bill** for supplying the raw material.

But there were also pilots sitting in the downed airplanes. And that is the last thing in the way of American products that comes from the Vietnamese sky. Some of them die a pirate's death. They are buried by the Vietnamese under little mounds of earth, on which a board carries their name (if it can be learned), their date of birth, and their crimes.

Others save themselves by parachute. And then the arrogant members of the master race from "God's Country" change into shamefaced, often trembling, wretches. From the unscrupulous people who given them their orders they have unsuspectingly received a star-spangled banner made of parachute silk, with a text written in ten languages in a form that is just as hypocritical and without feeling and as absurd and as undignified as the text below:

"I am an American. I don't speak your language. Owing to misadventure I must ask your help in obtaining food, shelter, and protection. Please take me to someone who is willing to see to my safety and to lead me back to my people. I will do everything in my power to see to it that you suffer no harm as a result of this. My government will reward you."

The Vietnamese to whom they hand this begging note on silk should in return hand them an answer printed on the cheapest paper in English:

"I am Vietnamese. I don't speak your language. Your crime compels me to protect my countrymen from you. I will bring you to someone who is concerned with your security and who will see to it that you do not soon return to your burning and murdering people. I will do my best to see that

my countrymen will suffer no more harm from you. My government will punish you."

[Photo caption: Among the belongings of downed US Pilot James H. Kasler is a document that speaks volumes].

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GOOD MILITARY COUNCIL ACTIVITY IS THE
FOUNDATION FOR COMPANY COMBAT STRENGTH

[Following is a translation of an article by Col. Hung Phong, Infantry Group X, in the Vietnamese-language newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army), Hanoi, 16 March 1967.]

In order to build up units with strong foundations, we have in the past and are presently carrying out the strengthening of organizations within the companies, including the strengthening of the military council organization.

Through a period of direction and observation of Company 2, the penetration company of the group, we saw that the military council had many active endeavors, assisting the company commander in achieving the three democracies: political, military and economic within the unit.

Relying on the firm leadership of the Party cell, everyone's spirit of collective management was developed. With the active endeavors of the military council, every aspect of the Company 2 mission was changed. Adopting the military council, the men have been able to contribute their constructive ideas, assisting the cadre to correct defects in styles of command and leadership, rectifying in a timely fashion the appearances of deviation in executing discipline and orders as well as in every stipulated system within the unit. Because of that, the spirit of unity between the cadre and men has become extremely close. In the military training assignment the military council of Company 2 has been able to urge every man to prepare very complete training aids, proposing the company commander set aside time for the men in lecture and exercise critiques. The lecture methods of the cadre have therefore constantly improved, the men have been able to accept quickly and the company has been able to attain the best training results in the group. During the

last training phase, in spite of the high demands, the complicated situation, and the extremely tense period of preparation, the military council collected the ideas of the men, organized a lively plan suggestion program and was able to assist the commander in resolving many difficulties, creating many strike methods appropriate to the detachments and small teams within the company. The cadre and men were caused to quickly become unanimous in their tactical ideology, insuring a fine result for the training phase. Before being tasked with assignment of penetration as the basic unit strength of the group, Company 2 was a unit which ate and drank the least; the kitchen and mess hall were not clean and the system of reporting open purchase was not executed precisely. But since the military council was added, through the criticism of the men, the cadre have elevated their responsibility, working closely with the management section and comrade cooks to improve cooking methods and to raise their responsibility to serve the men well. At this time the kitchen and mess hall are both clean. The men themselves have woven many baskets to hold rice, constructed a portable mess table, etc.

Company 2 has also taken a great step forward in weapons maintenance. From a company lacking in maintenance, Company 2 has now become a good weapon's maintenance unit with every weapon very clean. The ammunition, entrenching tools and other equipment is all arranged in a very orderly and neat manner.

Company 2 has been carrying out strengthening of its foundation for only a short time. The activity of the military council still lacks experience and there are still weaknesses, but throughout the practice activity we saw clearly that the military council was a very necessary organization for achieving the three democracies within the company. If the military council attains a firm, truly active and permanent strength, there will be manifested a spirit of collective management, a responsible concept and creative spirit of the rank and file, cadre and men, internal unity will be intensified and a foundation will be established to elevate the combat strength of the company.

In order that the military council will be able to manifest an active and strong effect, an important matter to consider is having the basic cadre and committee members in the military council firmly grasp that its essential function is to assist the commander in carrying out the three democracies. It should avoid plunging into work done by the youth group and company political work section such as organizing lectures, writing posters, organizing cultural productions, etc. Because the military council is an organization of the rank and file, representing the hopes of the rank and file, every effort must be made to emphasize education of all the cadre and men in the

company to have a responsibility to participate and contribute ideas to building up the unit in every aspect and they must make all effort to support the activities of the council. On the other hand, care must be taken to resolve well the coordination between the military council and the commander, and between the military council and the company political work section. Coordination between the military council and the company commander is coordination between an organization of the rank and file and a command organization. The military council's activities are under the direct control of the commander. The commander must create every favorable condition for the military council to be effective, and must note every opinion of the military council as it is the voice of the company cadre and men. The commander must seek every means to carry out proper and constructive ideas. If there are improper suggestions, there must be calm explanation and persuasion for the rank and file. The political work section is a political work organization with the mission of giving political assistance and direction to the rank and file organizations in the company. The military council must give attention to reminding the company cadre and men to participate in the activities advocated by the political work section.

Through the experiences of Company 2 we are able to see the military council has many rich and realistic activities. However, if it is desired the military council have good activities proper to its function, care must be taken to maintain a truly well-balanced existence, always reminding the commander to set aside time for meetings of the military council and the entire company at the precise times and making every effort to assist the military council in attaining good results because it is the most concentrated existence of democratic vitality in the company. Outside of the time-limit phases of existence, the military council committee members must regularly listen to and receive opinions from the cadre and men in order to report in a timely manner for the commander to resolve. On the other hand, the members of the military council committee have the responsibility of assisting the men with shortcomings and motivating them to improve, not considering that work the private matter of the commander. On the contrary, good education of slowly advancing men is in proper keeping with the functions of the military council.

We have just taken the first step in the movement to construct a foundation on political aspects. The activity of the military council within the unit is still not a great deal. We must still strive a great deal in order to attain better results and richer experience.

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COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY
COUNCIL AND PARTY YOUTH GROUP

[Following is a translation of an article by
Nguyen Huu Ich, Group Z Youth Adjutant, in the
Vietnamese-language newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan
(People's Army), Hanoi, 16 March 1967.]

The Party youth group and the military council are two organizations of the rank and file within the company, placed under the direct leadership of the Party cell, command and direction of the military and political commanders in the company.

Both organizations have the general mission of assembling unity of the masses around the Party cell, carrying out all policies and resolutions issued by the Party cell, changing every determination of leadership into a determination of the rank and file. Therefore, the activity of these two organizations is intimately related.

Although the two organizations have a common mission, each one has a separate position and assignment. The youth group is an advanced rank and file organization of the youth, the right arm and reserve unit of the Party cell within the unit, an attack force to profoundly complete every unit assignment. The youth group is also a school for Marxism-Leninism, a place for cultivating and supplementing the Party with outstanding cadre and Party members.

The military council is a rank and file organization under the leadership of the Party cell and command, aimed at developing the spirit and intelligence of the collective cadre and men to carry out the three democracies within the unit. One activity position of the military council is also aimed at inciting everyone to complete the assignments of victorious combat, training, and building up the company.

Recently we investigated the activity of these two organizations within a unit and saw that the comrades there had not yet firmly grasped the essence and function of each organization. The activities therefore were intermixed with each other. In daily life the Party group usually concerns itself with how many newspapers to issue, how many magazines, how many additional kilos of meat or vegetables to issue, to organize how many cultural affairs, etc. There are times when it goes out to investigate orders, combat, vehicles, policing up brass, hygiene work, etc. The military council occasionally can organize open purchase reports and cadre criticism. It can also discuss and carry out military club work.

On the occasion of the unit carrying out strengthening of its foundation, we have given attention to the encouragement of Party committee levels and the company commander to give complete and additional acknowledgement to the position and function of these two organizations, at the same time encouraging Party group secretaries, military council chairmen, and council members in their own position, mission and direction of activity. In the encouragement, we have taken a number of items done well and not so well by the unit in order to assist the men in promoting the activity aspects. We have encouraged the Party groups and the military council to understand methods of work when they have resolutions of the Party cell. Recently, the Party cell of Detachment 2 had a resolution concerning the problem of raising training quality. Afterwards the Party group held a discussion in order to thoroughly understand the aims of the mission and the training, discussed specific details, and confirmed the responsibility of the group members. The military council then organized periods of military democracy activity, plan suggestion, discussion, study, etc. The Party group gave attention to educating the group members to form a nucleus and become enthusiastically active, contributing much good initiative in the democratic activity sessions organized by the military council.

After we encouraged and gave specific guidance to the unit, we saw there were many good points. The Party group and the military council both were able to develop their own role and the activity became profound, in the right direction and from then on, was able to express the strength of the collective rank and file in the unit. The determination of the Party cell was transferred to become the determination of everyone.

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REASONS FOR LACK OF ACCOMPLISHMENT DISCOVERED

Following is a translation of an article
by Tran Van Chinh, Assistant Military
Council Chairman, Company 2, Antiaircraft
Group Y, in the North Vietnamese newspaper
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army), Hanoi,
16 March 1967

During a recent battle with American aircraft, conditions were not as complicated as many previous battles but my unit's accomplishments were not high. Afterwards the men had many different opinions. Seeing this, the military council organized a conference to discuss, gain experience and find the reasons why we had not yet attained favorable accomplishments. Each man spoke ardently and at the end all were unanimous on the cause. The target was not being quickly acquired and opportunities for shooting at the enemy were being missed. Under conditions where enemy aircraft performed complicated maneuvers, the unit did not take timely action, etc. Each of us have been able to find many methods to overcome the weak points in aspects of training, organization and command of the unit. Thanks to that, in following battles there were none of the above shortcomings and the unit attained outstanding accomplishments. There was a battle in which our company, along with friendly units, shot down and set afire eleven American jet aircraft.

Since then in my unit, everyone has recognized that the military council is a very good organization, representing the voices and aspirations of the rank and file. Thanks to widespread discussions concerning how to hold good training, how everyone can improve and discussions on looking after daily life, etc., the unit has been able to develop much initiative, overcome many difficulties and contribute great strength to the unit in every aspect. There was a period previously when the military council in my unit was not balanced or good and

had not yet carried out its responsibility correctly. It was still emphasizing club activity or trampling on the work of the Party group. In achievement of the three democracies, only the economic democracy aspect was being done well. We overcame those shortcomings in a timely manner. A number of cadre also previously did not consider the military council level to be important. There were comrades who thought that the standards of the enlisted men were limited and they were not able to contribute good ideas. There were also comrades who thought that to allow the men to criticize the cadre in front of everyone would have a bad effect on the prestige of the cadre, or were afraid democracy for enlisted men would go too far, etc. How can a man, especially a new man, when degrading himself and with no experience have the initiative to contribute to the unit? On the occasion of reelecting the military council the first of this year, my unit analyzed and criticized the above conclusions. There were comrade cadre who held a severe self-appraisal concerning the rank and file viewpoint. The men criticized themselves for the fact they had not yet attained a high collective management, for still degrading themselves and for depending on the cadre.

Because the conclusions concerning the mission and responsibility of the military council were correct, since I have been elected into the military council and entrusted with the position of assistant council chairman, although busy with work in the platoon, I have promised to complete the mission given me by the collective. I think that carrying out one's responsibilities well in the military council is precisely the basis for carrying out my work as platoon commander, contributing to the elevation of combat strength for the entire company.

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON USING RIFLES
TO DOWN AMERICAN AIRCRAFTS

Following is a translation of an article
by "M.K." in the Vietnamese-language news-
paper Quan Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army),
Hanoi, 21 and 22 Mar 67, p 2.

In the past, we introduced in Quan Doi Nhan Dan a number of methods of shooting down American aircrafts. After more than a year of shooting American planes at low altitude with rifles by the army, local army, militia, self-defense, and people's armed security forces, we would like to add to what had been said before. Let us review and develop the firing methods in order to accurately and adamantly shoot down many more American bandit aircrafts.

There are many methods of shooting down a plane, such as flat firing, horizontal predicted firing, and vertical predicted firing methods. The method to be used depends on the direction and tactics of the attacking plane.

Flat Firing Method

This method is used to shoot at an enemy plane when it dives directly in the direction of our position, or when it flies at low altitude from the coastal line or river mouth, or when it flies directly at the gun positions on the slope of a mountain or hill.

This is the easiest method of aiming and hitting an enemy plane because the riflemen just aim at the head of the coming plane and shoot, since the bullet line and the flight path basically coincide. The bullet and the plane are in opposite direction, therefore, the penetration strength of the bullet is much stronger. Furthermore, the head of a

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plane is a place where crucial equipment are located, therefore, the plane will be downed if it is hit there.

In using this method of firing, the rifleman must be brave and calm in spite of the fact that the enemy plane dives directly into his position. While firing, the commander gives the order, "Direction ..., prepare for flat firing ... fire!" When the enemy plane is at a range of 900 to 800 meters, the order should be given.

Everybody at his firing position should aim his rifle at the head of the plane and pull the trigger. Those who have machine-guns should fire from 8 to 12 shots while the riflemen who have semi-automatic rifles should fire continuously until the enemy plane zooms up out of the firing line (See figures 1 and 2).




Figure 1 Flat Firing at Enemy Plane Diving Directly into Gun Position

Key: 1. Start firing; 2. Stop firing.





Figure 2 Flat Firing at Enemy Plane Hedge Hopping from Valley, Coast Line, and River to the Gun Position

Key: 1. Stop firing.

Horizontal Predicted Firing Method

This method is used when the enemy plane crabs or flies in parallel with the gun positions. This method is more difficult to use than the previous one. Therefore, the militia, self defense units and army should train themselves in this firing method in order to have all the opportunities to down enemy planes. There are two types of horizontal (lateral) predicted firing methods:

a. Horizontal predicted firing with the aid of guiding objects. This method usually yields good results because of careful preparations of the rifle's positions, and advanced calculations of guiding objects and fire. When the enemy plane is at a distance of more than 2,000 meters, the commander gives the order: "Direction guiding object X ... prepare!" When the enemy plane reaches the guiding object, he gives the order to fire. Everybody at his gun position should turn his rifle to the direction of the guiding object to shoot on the order of the commander (See Figure 3).



← Include

Figure 3

Key: 1. Guiding object when the commander gives the stand by order; 2. Guiding object for the commander to give the firing order; 3. Guiding object for concentrated firing; 4. Gun positions.

b. Creeping predicted firing method. This method does not depend on guiding objects. It is used to shoot at low speed planes (from 50 to 80 m/s) or to shoot at parachutists or air mobile infantrymen.

For a group of riflemen, the commander gives the order: "Direction Y ... body of jet X ... prepare ... fire!" At his order, the riflemen aim at the plane and move the guns to the head of the plane. They should keep a constant predicted firing distance (the distance of predicted fire x 2) as determined by the commander. The target should coincide with the flight path of the plane. At the order, the riflemen should

next

(stop moving their guns and should pull the triggers.)

For an independent rifleman, he should move the rifle to a distance appropriate to the firing range (this distance is $1/2$ of the distance of the collective group's distance), and the target must be precisely on the flight path of the plane. The rifleman should move his rifle gradually and pull the trigger. He must do so in such a way that the target coincides with the predicted firing distance.

Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 22 Mar 67, p 2.7

(Vertical Predicted Firing Method

This method is used to shoot at an enemy plane flying directly over the gun positions, the the flight path is in parallel with the gun positions at a range of from 200 to 500 meters.

This method is also effective because the rifleman does not have to calculate the predicted flight distance, but all he has to do is to aim his rifle to a constant angle and wait for the enemy plane along its flight path. In using this method, the commander must have previous planning and calculation in order to give orders accurately with regard to the prediction range and the rifle's angle. These must be done according to the flight path of the plane, whether it is high or low, and the early or late detection of the enemy. These factors play a very important role in determining the following vertical predicted firing methods.

Diagonal vertical predicted firing method (the rifle is at an angle of 45°). If the plane flies over the gun positions at an altitude of from 200 to 500 meters, all the rifles should be at a 45° angle to form a concentrated net of bullets and wait for the plane flying along its flight path.

When the enemy plane is within the diagonal range of more than 2,000 meters, the commander gives the order, "Forward direction, 45° angle, stand by!" When the enemy plane is at the diagonal range of about 900-800 meters and at an altitude of 400-500 meters; or when it is at a diagonal range of 600-500 meters and an altitude of 200-300 meters, the commander gives the order to fire (See figure 4). At his order, all the rifles should be at an angle of about 40 to 45 degrees, and should fire concentratedly at a point along the flight path.

When there are conditions and time for preparation, the use of guiding objects is recommended because it is easier for the riflemen to aim at the plane and the firing range is calculated in advance. The firing will be thus more accurate (See figure 5).




Figure 5

Key to figures 4 and 5:

1. Stand by order; 2. fire order; 3. altitude; 4. more than 2,000 meters; 5. gun positions; 6. guiding object when the commander gives the stand by order; 7. guiding object when fire order is given; 8. guiding object for concentrated firing.

Vertical-Lateral Predicted Firing Method (Rifle is at a 90° angle).

When the enemy plane flies toward the firing direction and over the gun positions at an altitude of 200-500 meters and a distance of less than 1,500 meters, and when we failed to detect it at a earlier moment, this method is used to form a concentrated net of bullets above the gun positions at a point along its flight path.

When the enemy plane is at a diagonal distance of less than 1,500 meters, the commander gives the order, "Stand by, aim straight above." When the enemy plane is at a diagonal distance range of 700-600 meters from the gun positions, the firing order is given.

All riflemen and persons having machine guns under the flight path should aim straight above their head and fire. Those who are not directly under the flight path should aim straight above their head at an inclination toward the flight path. Those who have sub-machine guns with racks, or heavy machine guns should aim their guns with the widest angle (since the racks do not permit them to aim at a 90 degree angle). Everbody should pull the trigger and form a thick /

net of bullets at the flight path of the enemy plane (Figure 6).




Figure 6

Key: 1. Standby order; 2. Firing order; 3. Gun positions.

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STRENGTHEN THE BUILD UP OF
THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES AT NAM HA

[Following is a translation of an article by
Le Hong Khe in the Vietnamese-language news-
paper Quan Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army),
Hanoi, 21 Mar 67, p 4.]

The Standing Committee of Nam Ha Provincial Party Committee has just held a meeting to discuss the plan for carrying out the instruction of the Secretariat of the Central Party on strengthening the self-defense forces. The secretaries, members of the standing committees of Nam Ha municipal committee, city committees, factories, enterprises, state farms, districts, etc., in the province attended the meeting. There were also representatives of all services, bureaus, branches and militia units in the province.

After the report of a comrade of the standing committee on this work in the province, the meeting listened to five reports by Nam Dinh municipal party committee, Phu Ly city party committee, brigade 2 of Y Work at X factory, the women's self-defense platoon at D enterprise, and the self-defense unit of Quyet Tien cooperative at Phu Ly.

On the basis of the spirit of the instruction and the experiences indicated in the reports, the representatives at the meeting studied the weaknesses and strong points in the leadership of the self-defense forces in the past two years, particularly in 1966. During the two-year period of fighting the war of destruction of the American bandits, the self-defense forces in the province grew stronger and stronger both in quality and quantity. Their fighting strength reflected clearly in such activities as fighting, serving fighting, protecting security and order, solving problems after each battle, etc. Of special attention was the fact that the self-defense forces at many factories, enterprises, and cooperatives have shown their assault role both in production and fighting. They

have achieved many victories and contributed a part in the overall victory of Nam Ha province during last year.

The meeting also criticized many erroneous thinking such as the neglect of building up the self-defense forces under the pretext of the present dispersal situation; or the build-up of the self-defense forces will have adverse influence on production because the people will have to spend their time for training and fighting, etc.

With the understanding of the instruction of the Secretariat of the Central Party, the meeting determined to build up and consolidate the self-defense forces so that they will be strong and solid to meet the new situation and mission.

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THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF A BRIGADE DIRECTS
ALL ACTIVITIES OF ITS MILITARY COUNCIL

[Following is a translation of an unsigned
article in the Vietnamese-language newspaper
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army), Hanoi,
21 Mar 67, p 3.]

For a military council of a brigade to perform its function well, the political commissar must pay adequate attention to direct its activities.

Every month, in addition to presenting to party cells directions and contents of the military council with regard to its leadership and activities, the political commissar should seek to understand the most important points for the materialization of the three democratic principles in the brigade. He must have some ideas about the plans and work of the brigade, and must have ideas to direct its political, ideological, and organizational work in order to advance, to have unified ideas with the brigade leader, and to report to the committees of party cells and party branch.

On the basis of the party cells' resolutions, the political commissar should discuss with the brigade leader the political, military and logistic plans. He must popularize these ideas among the military council, and discuss with it measures and plans as well as formulas for developing democratic activities. The contents, measures and formulas must be closely linked with the training, fighting, working conditions, etc, and with the (dispersal or concentrated) living conditions of the brigade. It is also possible for the council to discuss these activities first, and the military and political leaders approve them afterwards.

The Party committees and brigade leader should divide among themselves the work of popularizing the party cells' resolutions and the working plan of the leaders to the

brigade, and they should explain clearly the problem of enlarging democratic principles in order to have opinions of the members, and they should combine the enthusiastic spirit of the brigade to contribute ideas and experiences with the desire to correct erroneous concepts and ideas. They must guide and reserve the time for the council to organize all forms of actions having a mass character, such as meeting for presenting and exchanging experiences, internal criticism; reviewing, and discussing problems in order to have an opinion of the brigade's members on the problems proposed by the brigade leader. It is sometimes necessary to guide the council to work carefully on certain subjects (such as posing questions, making fighting models, drawing maps, etc) in order to penetratingly and comprehensively collect ideas and opinions of the members. The expansion of democratic principles is to concentrate our efforts in executing the instructions and orders of the superior levels; this should not be done for "discussion" sake only.

After presenting the ideas of members of the brigade, it is necessary to have an exchange and unify ideas between the military and political leaders of the brigade and to have clear cut conclusions. If a problem is good, it is necessary to follow it up and to welcome it. If it is not quite good, these leaders must point out what is good and what is not good. When it is necessary, some principal ideas should be presented to members of the brigade so that they may discuss the problems. The aim of this is to have unified ideas and action, and unification within the brigade in order to guarantee discipline while carrying out these ideas.

The political commissar must respect the council as the brigade leader does. He must lead cadres in the brigade to support the council, to respond and set good example in joining the activities of the council. He should not have a low esteem of the council, nor should he use it as a tool to carry out his own ideas.

(After the notebook of a political commissar,
Quan Doi Nhan Dan publishing house.)

GREAT VICTORIES TO BE ATTAINED
DURING TRAINING YEAR 1967

[Following is a translation of an editorial in the
Vietnamese-language newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan
(People's Army), Hanoi, 16 March 1967.]

In order to attain even greater victories in the task of resisting America and saving the Nation, our armed forces must not cease the raising of their combat strength, standards of combat readiness and completion of their mission with all the people to strike and defeat the invading American pirates under all combat conditions.

On the basis of intensified political education assignments, ideological leadership, unceasing support of determined revolutionary standpoints, the will to fight and defeat the invading American pirates, the development of a strong revolutionary heroism, unselfish combat readiness for independence, freedom and the Fatherland's socialism, the combat training assignment must be more strongly promoted, aimed at uplifting the political and military quality of the armed forces.

In the past, the combat training assignment has followed the right direction in thorough understanding of the Party's military policy, always sticking close to combat reality. Many favorable accomplishments have thus been obtained. Naturally, in confronting the tense and violent combat demands and assignments and in opposing the gang of American invaders, at present insanely intensifying the war, the combat training assignment must continue to strongly develop its favorable points and make them even better. All of our military need to place their hearts and strength into the work of tactical and technical training, struggling to become skilled fighting men and units. When necessary to fight in any place or at any time, it must be assured there are one hundred victories for one hundred battles.

It is necessary to always actively and earnestly raise the training and combat quality. All of our military must more thoroughly and profoundly understand the viewpoint and military ideology of the Party, stick close to combat reality, firmly grasp and utilize all wise and creative methods to strike the pirates, to cause our combat training assignments to progress daily with high quality.

To respond to that mission's demands, we need to immediately continue a more profound assignment of preparation for carrying out truly well the 1967 training year.

First of all we must especially be concerned with leadership, organizing opening of a training conference, and an examination of a more thorough understanding of the military policy and combat directions and principles of the Party. On that basis, the complete recognition of the direction, mission contents, and this year's training methods, firmly grasp demands to raise the troop's combat quality. We must adopt and hold thorough discussions in order to achieve a unanimous, determined and high degree in the achievement of the training mission, preventing all passive appearances, fear of difficulty and hardship, and satisfaction in a desire to stand still. We must promote a spirit of creativity in the training, overcoming the appearances of being mechanical, simplified, subjective, etc. We must not only open a conference to examine a thorough understanding of the directions, contents and specific training assignments of each unit, cadre of all ranks and especially basic cadre, but we must also support in a timely manner the essential tactical and technical specialties along with training organization and methods. Only when this has been favorably achieved can the step in detachment and soldier training attain the desired results, consistent with the special characteristics and new demands of this year's training. Each cadre must promote a spirit of political responsibility before the Party and people, a responsibility for the blood of the men and the people, to exhaustively examine, train and swiftly raise personal standards in order to insure good unit training and skilful combat troop command. Active support of the training mission, contents and methods for this year is a great demand which must not only be done well during the training preparation period but must also be continued throughout the training process.

During the training preparation period, we must give truly careful attention to preparation of lessons and training aids in order to create additional conditions for teaching and studying that are truly realistic, closely aligned with combat demands. Commanders and staff organizations must rely on experience of previous years and present training demands that have been carefully calculated. They must have a firm plan of direction in order to both insure preparation of lessons and training aids responsive to training demands and to avoid

wasting the efforts and strength of the troops. It is necessary to adopt the education and support of a determined will to fight and defeat the invading American pirates that will mobilize all the cadre and men to uplift their concept of self reliance and diligence to build up the army. Command and leadership cadre must truly extend democracy with the masses to hold discussions, manifest initiative and overcome difficulties. Urge the masses to find every means of working completely and well in every necessary aspect of the new training year. It must be thus before we have a material basis to overcome every occurrence of artificialness and inadvertence in teaching and study.

Effective immediately we must prepare well the political mission in combat training, insuring that everyone has a high determination in their combat and technical training. Organizations of the masses such as military conferences, labor youth Party groups, club committees, etc., must actively prepare contents and methods to actively serve the training mission of each unit. Under the leadership of the Party ranks in the unit, especially that of the Party cells, the political assignment must be assured of mobilizing and organizing the masses to advance into the combat and technical training with an air of training troops to hotly and effectively strike America. During the present tense combat situation, the political assignment in training is extremely important in that it assures the training is of high quality. Thus, we must actively and carefully make both internal and external preparations to cause the political assignment express the best effect in the combat training.

The war of resistance against America and to save the Nation is presently demanding all the military to struggle and strive to excel in their tactical, technical and combat spirit. We must carry out well the 1967 training year, first to carry out well the work of preparation for the new year, creating additional favorable conditions for raising the quality of the troop's training and insuring that under any circumstance or situation that we may strike skilfully and attain great victory on the battlefield.

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RAPID PRODUCTION BY ARMAMENTS FACTORY

[Following is an article by Nguyen Duc Tha in the Vietnamese-language newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army), Hanoi, 16 March 1967.]

In 1966 the Military Region 4 armaments factory completed the entire years plan before 10 days. Developing that splendid accomplishment, the entire factory commences the year 1967 with a determination to produce weapons and machinery even faster than before.

In every line of production and living, the teams have been logically improved and firmly united. Tools, raw materials and supplies have been arranged in the order of production and repair requirements. Because of that, when engaged in the work, each person and each group has been harmoniously and uniformly active with no loss in time searching for work.

To serve the combat in a timely fashion, each branch has organized many cadre and repairmen groups to go to gun platoons, to every battlefield of the military region, prepared to repair damages and determined not to allow gun damage wait for workmen. In all of their own work, the men have searched to express initiative, reducing movement and insuring quality. Comrade Trinh Ba Nghia has examined and been able to reduce an unneeded movement. Comrade Nguyen Ngoc Quy alone has continued to assure sufficient electrical service for teams to be active.

In response to the hopes of the fighting men battling America at the emplacements, the cadre, men and laborers of the entire factory have mobilized each other in boiling competition to attain the highest production. Recently, in only one day the factory achieved many outstanding accomplishments. Detachment A exceeded its quota by 47.9 %, producing 15 types of goods. Pouring their hatred into hammer heads and anvils, the metal forging team exceeded their quota by 54.4%. Comrades Dinh and

Que have brought their own productivity up to 164%, leading the entire team. By not only expressing initiative but also by improving technique, the lathe team has exceeded its quota by 45.9%. Comrade Dung attained the highest productivity of the team, surpassing the plan by 68.8%. Detachment 2 has overcome every difficulty on its way to accomplish the mission, actively stepping upward day by day, shouldering tons of goods, and exceeding the plan by 7%. Besides the assignment of assuring their own repair and production plan, the men of Detachment A have assaulted the undertaking of carrying and transferring goods, raw materials, and supplies, regularly serving the entire factory. There are teams who have been able to produce as many substitute gun parts in one day as was previously done in 7 days. Because of that, many guns have been released from the factory before the time limit.

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OPINIONS ON IMPROVING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

[Following is a translation of a two-part article by Tran Duc in the Vietnamese-language newspaper, Nhan Dan (The People), Hanoi, 17 and 18 March 1967.]

The year 1966 was the second year of resistance against the war of destruction; the year that agriculture continued to act as the base for the rear area of the anti-American, nation-preserving war, and, at the same time, the base for the development of industry. Although natural disasters were bad, and the imperialist Americans attacked viciously, agricultural production was still able to be advanced, many areas reaped good harvests and there appeared on the Five Ton Gold Plaque the names of many new cooperatives, districts and even one province. Good examples of high rice and vegetable production, cultivation and stock raising, have sprung up in many places, even in areas which normally meet with trouble in production.

In the guidance of agriculture, we cadre have positively gone down to assist the cooperatives to resolve their difficulties, promote production and establish exemplary "Four Goods" Party Committees and Chapters to be the nucleus for close leadership of all activities in the rural areas. We have expanded the improvement of cooperative management, improving techniques for the areas, including the mountainous areas and those areas which are directly involved in the battle, providing a motive force for the completion of the victory of the agricultural production plan. We understand thoroughly the development of agriculture in wartime and the guidelines set down by Central which are to positively attack the enemy on the economic front under all circumstances so that agriculture can insure its role of a rear area for the anti-American, nation-preserving war, and as a base for the development of industry.

These are the reasons for the victories in agricultural production during the two years of resistance against the war of destruction. On the other hand, in the past, the war and natural disasters have shown up a few bad points in our leadership. Therefore, we must review the victories, the deficiencies and the bad points in the system so as to have experience in agricultural guidance for reinforcement in the future.

1. First of all, we who work in agriculture must, at all times, be prepared to resist any natural disasters and enemy destruction.

Many years experience shows us that the weather is never the same from one year to the next and natural disasters happen. Moreover, the crafty enemy often coordinates with natural disasters to cause more damage. Therefore, we must always remain highly alert to cope with natural disasters and enemy destruction. This posture is displayed in the deployment and manner of production, establishment of a material and technical foundation, and the all inclusive guidance and management of the cooperatives.

In the correction of, or increase in, methods of production, we must take into consideration the situation in case of a natural disaster or enemy destruction. Each cooperative must have a prior plan for the desired amounts of spring rice, vegetables and fall rice. If something unexpected occurs, changes can be made to reduce the amount of crops to be grown in that area. For instance, either spring rice or vegetables could be increased. But, most important is that we be prepared before hand, so that when it comes time to make a change, we can remain the masters of the situation with seeds, experience and the resolve not to allow our feet to get wet before we move.

All Party echelons and cooperatives must constantly be in control of the material and technical foundation of agriculture, giving due attention to the capability for resisting natural disasters and enemy destruction. When a cooperative losses its harvest, it is usually because of flood, drought or insects. Therefore, all cooperatives' administrative sections must regularly inspect the condition of buckets, reels, water pumps, insecticide spray guns and fuel so that they can cope with the situation when faced with natural disasters or enemy destruction.

As to guidance and management, the basic level cadre must be educated so as to avoid the worst conditions. When there is trouble, the organization and management must be of such a nature as to best concentrate on the primary job to be done, there must be a prearranged plan for this and regular inspections of the fields, the water situation and the insect planning and reporting network, and the agricultural weather network must discover any trouble in time for the cooperatives to put their plans into effect and cope with all situations.

2. Provide good leadership for both the positive establishment of the material and technical foundation and the good management of the material and technical foundation which already exists.

During the past two years in the war situation, we have increased the establishment of the material and technical foundation for agriculture by water conservation, field establishment, increase of the source of manure and supplying equipment to the cooperatives. This is the victory of the new production relations which are only beginning to be polished by the war and is the beautiful manifestation of socialism. However, the facts show that many cooperatives were able to achieve a high yield with a normal material and technical foundation, and in many cooperatives, though they have made a great effort to increase their material and technical foundations, their yield has remained the same as before. Here, we must find the reason, in the methods and content of the establishment of the material and technical foundation, for whether it serves the intensification or not, and, another important point, whether or not there is good management of both the old and the

newly established material and technical foundations.

Along with the establishment of new material and technical foundations, there must be positive and correct management of the foundation which is already in existence. In that manner, we shall be able to develop the economy most effectively, sometimes even more than with establishing new foundations which lack good management so cannot develop a function. In the war situation, the establishment of material and technical foundations cannot but meet with difficulties, therefore, along with the positive establishment according to suitable methods and on a suitable scale, we must endeavor to develop the function of, protect and manage well, those foundations which are already in existence.

3. While advancing the technical revolution in agriculture, the experiences of the masses in production should be considered strongly, and advances must be made by steps and surely.

We have increased the material and technical foundation for agriculture and positively introduced technical science into production, encouraged the technical revolution during the time of war, even in those areas which are fighting fiercely, because we consider this the fulcrum of the establishment of socialism which is daily, hourly, more enthusiastically manifested in the fields.

Revolution is the profession of the masses. Therefore, when we are organizing and leading the masses into science and technology, we must consider their experience which is based on a long period of production, and guide them in discussions, weighing the different facets of technology, economics and life while coordinating the production experiences of the masses with the technological knowledge of the specialist cadre. Only in this manner will our advances be secure and strong and avoid the tendency toward subjectivity and over enthusiasm in the dissemination of the new technology. Recently, when beginning the winter-spring crop, in a number of areas, the cadre encouraged the planting of rice seedlings in rows and sowing sparsely, but forgot to push the planting of some extra, so, in the end, there were not enough seedlings to transplant. We encourage backhanded transplanting for shallow planting, which helps speed up the sprouting of branches after transplanting, but there were places which, near the end of the crop period, were still mechanically following the new ways so as to achieve 100 percent of their land area. Also, as in the 1966 harvest, in some places they encouraged the changeover to a high yield rice, but it was a type which lost its value as seed plants early, thus causing difficulties for the masses just prior to the harvest.

We definitely must adopt the experiences of the masses in order to gradually expand the movement. The introduction of technology into the masses is a revolutionary project which has great popular significance, but it can not be done hastily, and we must make use of popular education and practical application in order to convince them. This must absolutely be done without orders or pressure. When we expand from the test points to the large areas, we must be very careful, because the production conditions over a large area are always more complicated than they are in a single point, and the guidance surely cannot be as concentrated as in the test points. The setting of technological standards, the establishment of a system and a production schedule marks a step toward the maturation of the project to

introduce science and technology into agricultural production, but this is a very new, very difficult and very complicated job. This is also a manner of leading agriculture in the manner of industry, but it requires the skillful coordination of the experiences of the masses with science and technology. We must respect the spirit of the region and the ancient experiences of the masses in the guidance of the harvests and the intensification procedures.

4. Never cease to consolidate and perfect the new production relations in the rural areas to develop production.

The consolidation and perfection of the new production relations in the agricultural production cooperatives must be closely linked to the consolidation and perfection of the new production relations throughout the rural areas. Along with the consolidation and perfection of all types of cooperatives, with the agricultural production cooperatives as the most important, we must make an effort to consolidate all cooperatives in the area of circulation and distribution in order to serve production and life. Simultaneously, we must consolidate the state owned agricultural and forestry worksites and all agricultural research farms to develop the function of examples and increase to a higher degree the assistance given in the areas in which cooperatives have been developed. We have delegated the management of agricultural and forestry worksites in the war situation in order to consolidate that state owned business so as to be more secure, and to establish a good relationship between state owned and cooperative economies.

Many provinces have concentrated on establishing strain selection farms for both crops and stock, artificial insemination stations, veterinary medicine factories, tool and small machinery repair nets, consolidating the electric and diesel pumping stations, etc, in order to directly serve the production development of the cooperatives, concretely and dynamically displaying the enthusiastic assistance of the laboring class for the collective farmer class.

5. Organize democratic mass movements to discuss and enthusiastically carry out the National Plan.

If we wish to begin a democratic mass movement to carry out the Plan, we must arouse the masses from the very beginning of the establishment of the plan, we cannot depend solely upon the cadre to set up the plan and only consider the carrying out of the Plan as the responsibility of the masses. All through the establishment as well as the arousal to carry out the Plan, the most important, most common factor to encourage the spirit of positive production of the masses is the never ending raising in the level of socialist awareness and the masses' spirit of being collective leaders. This point is extremely important in the situation in the North, wherein we must daily, hourly, cope with the imperialist American war of destruction. Only in this manner will the masses stand up by themselves, overcome all difficulties and obstacles and advance the production movement no matter what the circumstances. Along with a continuous, regular political and ideological education project, we must strictly examine the carrying out of the policies of the Government and the Party, and set up a clear system to insure democracy, correct bureaucratic habits, orders, greed, waste and transgressions on the democracy and the rights of the cooperative members to be collective

masters in all activities of the cooperatives. Only in that way will the masses have true peace of mind and be truly enthusiastic about the development of production. This is one of the main items which must be discussed and decided clearly by the members in the high level cooperative regulations, and soon the cooperatives will discuss and establish them.

6. Along with regular production guidance problems, we must give particular attention to the resolution of basic problems of agriculture.

Advancing an agricultural economy, which is dependant on small scale production, directly to socialism without first going through the stage of developing capitalism, causes many basic problems for us. If we do not debate and resolve these problems well, it will be a long and difficult time before we will be able to strongly and securely advance to a modern agricultural base, and we are having some troubles presently. During wartime, we must also give even more attention to the basic problems, because we can very easily be pulled into daily work. The basic problems of agriculture are rather numerous, such as the long term agricultural development plan, the division of the economic areas, the cadre training plan, the advance of the socialist revolution in the rural areas, the establishment of the new countryside, the organizational and guidance systems in agriculture, etc. The control of agriculture in the North is also one of the basic problems which we are promoting, such as the making of soil maps and agriculturization maps of the provinces, obtaining documentation on the weather in different areas to serve the agricultural weather project, etc.

The debate and resolution of basic problems of agriculture is not just the responsibility of the central branches, but is also the responsibility of the rural areas, it is not just the responsibility of the agricultural branch, but also of the other economic and cultural branches.

7. Lastly, we must increase the control of the execution of the policies, decisions and platforms of the Party and the Government, and have complete control of the proletarian viewpoint in the development of the wartime economy.

In the control of policies and methods, we must understand thoroughly the proletarian viewpoint in the development of the economy. Strict criticism of any tendency toward formalism in the establishment of mutual fields and the water conservation projects, of the tendency to build farms which are big and beautiful while disregarding the resolution of the feed problem for stock in the guidance of collective swine raising and of the tendency to do things beautifully while not resolving even the most common of problems, is the requirement of the masses.

We must expose and strictly criticize the diseases of excitability, bureaucracy and the giving of orders in the activities of the countryside. The province and district cadre should go to the cooperatives and discuss the resolution of difficulties with the cooperative cadre and encourage the village and cooperative cadre to go to the units in the fields, then, surely, a new attitude will arise in the countryside, preparing the way for the high tide of agricultural production in the future.

PREVENTING SKIN DISEASES OF THE TROOPS

[Following is a translation of an article by Doctor Le Cuong in the Vietnamese-language newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army), 16 March 1967.]

Through a realistic health examination of a number of antiaircraft companies, we see skin diseases fairly widespread, causing itching, discomfort, loss of sleep, and a lack of concentrated ideology in study activity. If itching is severe, the loss of sleep shall effect the combat strength.

The types of skin diseases most commonly contracted by the men are: ringworm, weeping scabies, skin tumor, eczema, etc. The cause of these diseases is the constant necessity for the men to stand combat watches, the limited time available for body hygiene, and the fact that a number of comrades still have unsanitary habits such as sleeping in clothing soaked with perspiration (heat and dampness provide favorable conditions for diseases to develop), hanging clothing out at night in the dew and hanging underwear on trees and bushes (places and conditions with disease causing spores).

With a knowledge of the reasons for and the harm caused by these diseases, we need to have active preventative methods as follows:

1. Intensify daily forms of washing. Wipe the body to dry the perspiration and body excretions. Before going to sleep, insure the skin is dry and clean. Daily use a personal wash cloth and soap. If it is only possible to bathe once a week, wash the pubic area with soap every two or three days.

This area must be regularly kept clean. Because it is concealed, the perspiration collects, creates an odor and becomes unclean. For the most part, ringworm and itching sores begin in the thigh area before spreading over the entire body. Under the present conditions at the antiaircraft emplacements,

we have seen that those methods can be carried out.

During the winter, company medics and aid-men must even more encourage the men to make every effort to bathe, wash and keep themselves clean. A number of gun companies (such as Company 1, Group X) stationed near the coal fields, have picked up fallen coal to heat water for bathing and washing clothes. The percentage of those contracting scaly skin and skin tumors has therefore been the lowest. Company 5, stationed near the sea, has urged its men to bathe first in salt water, rinsing with fresh water afterwards. Here also, there has been little disease.

2. When underclothing has become soaked with perspiration, although recently changed, it should be laundered or dried in the sun or wind. Damp clothing should not be worn while sleeping. In the summer, disease will spring up and during the winter, a cold will be contracted.

Clothing should not be hung out in the night dew as the dampness provides good conditions for ringworm spores to develop. Do not dry clothing carelessly on trees and brush, locations with many spores that cause disease. The sleeping mat should not be spread out through the day but should be rolled or hung out in the sun. Before spreading it out to lie down, it must be shaken for cleanliness.

3. Every effort must be made to avoid transmission of the disease to the other men from those who have ringworm, scabies, spores, etc. Avoid their sleeping near each other during the treatment period.

Their clothing must be boiled and hung on separate lines. Avoid scratching the areas affected by scabies or ringworm lest the disease be spread to other sound areas of the skin. The area must first be lightly washed with soap and water, then apply the following medications:

Scabies: Apply and rub in a 10% DDT-alcohol solution.
(10g DDT mixed with 90cc alcohol)

Other spore diseases (herpes, ringworm, etc.):
Apply a 1% solution of diluted alcohol and iodine, or salicylic acid.

Eczema: Apply medications to soothe and disinfect the skin such as penicillin or pathalo salves (medications drawn from the regimental aid station or purchased from a store).

Skin diseases are diseases often contracted by the men of antiaircraft emplacements. These diseases cause itching, discomfort, loss of sleep and have an effect on the combat strength of the troops. Skin diseases are contagious and will quickly spread throughout the company, causing discomfort and complications. Comrades with scabies, eczema and bacterial infections must be sent to a hospital for long periods of

treatment. Therefore, it is necessary that all the cadre and men, the medics and aid men, actively promote the methods of prevention in order to eliminate these diseases.

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